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 NOTE 
Deference, Clarity, and the Future of 
Arbitration in Investor-State Dispute 
Settlements 
BG Group, PLC v. Republic of Argentina, 134 S. Ct. 1198 (2014). 
ROBERT N. MACE* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Since the end of World War II, foreign investment has been a primary con-
tributor to the increasing globalization of world economies.
1
  The incursion of 
foreign funds has allowed developing economies to create infrastructure, expand 
employment opportunities, and move toward modernization.
2
  International oppor-
tunities have allowed investors to expand their portfolios and establish a solid 
footing in the future of the global marketplace.
3
  Despite the advantages, investing 
across international borders is not without risk:  cultural and legal differences, 
lack of citizen privileges, and differing priorities between investors and sovereign 
states become barriers for parties wishing to do business with one another.  Many 
nations have established a legal framework in the form of bilateral investment 
treaties (BITs) to overcome the disadvantages.
4
 
In BG Group v. Republic of Argentina, the U.S. Supreme Court was presented 
with a case of first impression dealing with a dispute resolution provision con-
tained in a BIT.  BG Group, a British investor in Argentinian natural gas distribu-
tion, argued that an arbitration panel should be given deference in its decision to 
waive a pre-arbitration requirement contained in a BIT.
5
  Lacking precedential 
authority concerning arbitration agreements contained in treaties, lower courts 
disagreed whether the pre-arbitration issue was primarily for judicial or arbitral 
determination.
6
  Ultimately, the Court chose to apply the interpretive framework 
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of Law, 2016; Journal of Dispute Resolution, Lead Articles Editor, 2015-16; Associate Member, 2014-
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 1. Jeswald W. Salacuse & Nicholas P. Sullivan, Do BITs Really Work?: An Evaluation of Bilateral 
Investment Treaties and Their Grand Bargain, 46 HARV. INT’L L.J. 67, 68 (2005). 
 2. Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public 
International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521, 1524 (2005). 
 3. Id. at 1524-25. 
 4. See U.N. Conference on Trade and Dev., World Investment Report 2013: Global Value Chains: 
Investment And Trade For Development, at 101, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WIR/2013 (2013) [hereinafter 
World Investment Report 2013]. 
 5. BG Grp., PLC v. Republic of Arg., 134 S. Ct. 1198, 1205 (2014). 
 6. Id. 
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utilized in the review of domestic commercial arbitration agreements, and estab-
lished that arbitration agreements in investment treaties are to be evaluated and 
enforced under traditional contract theories.
7
 
II.  FACTS & HOLDING 
During the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Republic of Argentina initiated a 
series of economic reforms aimed at stimulating the economy by reducing infla-
tion and public debt and increasing foreign investment.
8
  To encourage foreign 
investment, Argentina entered into BITs with numerous countries.
9
  One BIT, 
which forms the controversy at issue in BG Group, PLC was The Agreement for 
the Promotion and Protection of Investments (Treaty)
10
 with the United King-
dom.
11
  Under the treaty, Argentina agreed to take steps to encourage U.K. inves-
tors to invest within its borders, and the United Kingdom agreed to do the same 
with respect to Argentine investors.  The Treaty was signed by Argentina and the 
United Kingdom in 1990 and became effective in 1993.
12
  Importantly, the Treaty 
assured foreign investors they would be given “fair and equitable treatment” and 
prevented the host country from “expropriating the assets of . . . [foreign inves-
tors] without just compensation.”13  The two nations agreed to include a dispute-
resolution provision
14
 that would authorize arbitration of disputes between inves-
tors and the country of investment under two circumstances:  (1) after the dispute 
had been submitted to a local court or (2) upon agreement of both parties.
15
 
Around the same time, BG Group, a United Kingdom company, acquired a 
majority interest in MetroGAS, an Argentine gas distributor.
16
  MetroGAS was a 
product of an Argentine economic reform that privatized the state-owned gas utili-
ty and divided it into new private companies open to foreign investment.
17
  Argen-
tina granted MetroGAS a thirty-five-year exclusive license to distribute natural 
                                                          
 7. Id. at 1217-18. 
 8. Republic of Arg. v. BG Grp. PLC, 715 F. Supp. 2d 108, 113 (D.D.C. 2010) rev’d, 665 F.3d 1363 
(D.C. Cir. 2012) rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 1198, 1188 (2014) and vacated, 555 F. App’x 2 (D.C. Cir. 2014) 
and aff’d, 555 F. App’x 2 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 9. Id. 
 10. See Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Arg.-U.K., Dec. 11, 1990, 1765 
U.N.T.S. 33 [hereinafter Arg.-U.K. Agreement for Investments]. 
 11. Republic of Arg., 715 F. Supp. 2d at 113. 
 12. Republic of Arg. v. BG Grp., PLC, 665 F.3d 1363, 1366 (D.C. Cir. 2012) cert. granted, 133 S. 
Ct. 2795 (U.S. 2013) and rev’d, BG Grp., PLC v. Republic of Arg., 134 S. Ct. 1198 (2014) and vacat-
ed, 555 F. App’x 2 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 13. Republic of Arg., 715 F. Supp. 2d at 113 (quoting Cross-Motion for Recognition and Enforce-
ment of Arbitral Award at 1). 
 14. Article 8(2) of the Treaty provides for arbitration under two circumstances: 
 (a) if one of the Parties so requests . . . :  
(i)  where, after a period of eighteen months has elapsed from the moment when the dispute 
was submitted to [a] competent tribunal of the Contracting party in whose territory the 
investment was made, the said tribunal has not given its final decision; 
(ii) where the final decision of the aforementioned tribunal has been made but the Parties are 
still in dispute; 
(b) where the Contracting Party and the investor of the other Contracting Party have so agreed. 
Arg.-U.K. Agreement for Investments, art. 8(2), supra note 10, at 38. 
 15. BG Grp., PLC v. Republic of Arg., 134 S. Ct. 1198, 1203 (2014). 
 16. Republic of Arg., 715 F. Supp. 2d at 113. 
 17. BG Grp., PLC, 134 S. Ct. at 1204. 
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gas in Buenos Aires and portions of the Buenos Aires metropolitan area.
18
  The 
license stated that tariffs would be calculated in U.S. dollars and would be eligible 
for review to ensure a reasonable return to investors.
19
 
An economic collapse in 2001 and 2002 prompted Argentina to enact emer-
gency laws and regulations that directly affected MetroGAS.
20
  These replaced the 
U.S. dollar standard for tariff calculations with the lesser-valued peso
21
 and stayed 
any lawsuits regarding the new laws for 180 days.
22
  To mitigate the negative 
impact of the measures, Argentina established a renegotiation process for public 
service contracts, but excluded companies that elected to dispute the laws in court 
or arbitration.
23
  MetroGAS began sustaining losses, prompting BG Group to file a 
Notice of Arbitration
24
 against Argentina pursuant to the Treaty.
25
  The parties 
agreed to hold arbitration hearings in Washington, D.C. under the United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law rules with the International Chamber of 
Commerce as the appointing authority.
26
 
In arbitration, BG Group argued Argentina’s enactment of laws affecting 
MetroGAS violated the Treaty by expropriating its investment without just com-
pensation and by denying it fair and equitable treatment.
27
  Argentina denied it 
had violated the Treaty and asserted the arbitration was without jurisdiction under 
the Treaty.
28
  Argentina reasoned because BG Group was not an “investor,” its 
interest in MetroGAS was not an “investment” and BG Group did not first submit 
the dispute to an Argentine court as required by the Treaty.
29
 
In December 2007, the arbitration panel unanimously found Argentina had 
not expropriated BG Group’s investment but had denied BG Group “fair and equi-
table treatment.”30  The panel rejected Argentina’s argument that it lacked juris-
diction to arbitrate, concluding BG Group was an “investor” and MetroGAS was 
an “investment” under the Treaty, and that by limiting court access to companies, 
Argentina excused BG Group’s failure to first submit the dispute to a local court.31  
The panel awarded BG Group $185 million in damages.
32
 
                                                          
 18. Republic of Arg. v. BG Grp., PLC, 665 F.3d 1363, 1366 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
 19. Id. 
 20. BG Group, PLC, 134 S. Ct. at 1204. 
 21. Id. (the exchange rate was roughly 3 pesos for 1 U.S. dollar, reducing profits immediately by 
one-third and increasing volatility because of the peso’s inconsistent exchange rate). 
 22. Republic of Arg., 665 F.3d at 1367. 
 23. BG Grp., PLC, 134 S. Ct. at 1205. 
 24. The proceedings were initiated on April 25, 2003.  Republic of Arg. v. BG Group, PLC, 715 F. 
Supp. 2d 108, 113 (D.D.C. 2010). 
 25. Over 25 foreign investors initiated arbitration against Argentina regarding the new laws.  See 
Mem. of Points and Authorities of BG Grp., PLC in Opp’n to Mot. to Vacate and in Supp. of Cross 
Mot. for Recognition and Enforcement and for a Pre-Judgment Bond at 2; Republic of Arg. v. BG 
Group, PLC, 715 F. Supp. 2d 108, 113 (D.D.C. 2010). 
 26. Republic of Arg., 665 F.3d at 1367. 
 27. BG Grp., PLC, 134 S. Ct. at 1204. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id.; see also Republic of Arg. v. BG Grp. PLC, 715 F. Supp. 2d 108, 114 (D.D.C. 2010). 
 31. BG Grp., PLC, 134 S. Ct. at 1204-05 (citing App. To Pet. For Cert. at 99a, 145a, 161a, 171a 
(No. 12-138), 2012 WL 3091067).  The panel determined the 180-day stay of court decisions arising 
from the new measures and the exclusion of some firms from the renegotiation process “hindered” BG 
Group from recourse “to the domestic judiciary.”  As a result, the Treaty implicitly excused compli-
ance with the local litigation requirement.  Id. at 1205, 1212 (citing App. To Pet. For Cert. at 165 (No. 
12-138), 2012 WL 3091067). 
 32. Id. at 1205. 
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In 2008, both parties filed for review in the District Court for the District of 
Columbia.
33
  BG Group sought to affirm the award under the Federal Arbitration 
Act (FAA).
34
  Argentina sought to vacate the award under the FAA, arguing the 
arbitration panel lacked jurisdiction because BG Group failed to adhere to the 
local litigation requirements of the Treaty.
35
  The District Court affirmed the 
award, holding courts must give great deference to the determinations of the arbi-
tration panel and the panel had not exceeded its authority in its interpretation of 
the local litigation requirement.
36
  The Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit reversed; determining the interpretation and application of the local 
litigation requirement was an independent question of law for the courts to decide 
de novo.
37
  The Court of Appeals held the arbitration panel erred by determining 




The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and held that when a 
court reviews an arbitration made under a treaty, it should apply the interpretive 
framework developed for traditional contracts in American law.
39
  Under this 
framework,
40
 the Court found the local litigation requirement was a procedural 
precondition to arbitration and, as such, was presumptively for an arbitrator to 
decide.
41
  The Court found nothing in the Treaty that overcame that presumption, 
thus the judgment of the arbitrators should have been given deference by the re-
viewing courts.
42
  Upon deferential review, the Court determined the conclusions 
of the arbitration panel were lawful and within its interpretive authority.
43
  The 
Court ultimately held that without explicit limitations on consent, a local litigation 
requirement is primarily for arbitrators to interpret and apply.
44
 
III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Because a party can only be required to submit a dispute to arbitration if it has 
previously agreed to do so, consent is a pivotal question in arbitration cases.
45
  
Inherent in the question of consent is the antecedent question of whether the judge 
or the arbitrator should determine whether there was initial consent.
46
  The distinc-
tion is significant:  arbitral awards are subject to judicial review with great defer-
ence given to arbitral decisions, but questions reserved for the courts are reviewed 
                                                          
 33. Id. 
 34. Id.; see also 9 U.S.C. §§ 204, 207 (2015) (providing a party can confirm an award in Federal 
court). 
 35. BG Grp., PLC, 134 S. Ct. at 1205; see also 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) (2015) (allows the vacating of an 
award in Federal court when arbitrators “exceeded their powers”). 
 36. Republic of Arg. v. BG Grp., PLC, 715 F. Supp. 2d 108, 121-22 (D.D.C. 2010). 
 37. Republic of Arg. v. BG Grp., PLC, 665 F.3d 1363, 1370 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
 38. Id. at 1373. 
 39. BG Grp., PLC, 134 S. Ct. at 1201; see also infra notes 87-90 and accompanying text. 
 40. BG Grp., PLC, 134 S. Ct. at 1201 (courts usually look first to the plain text in order to determine 
whether a dispute arises out of the arbitration, or whether it is a dispute about the agreement to arbi-
trate). 
 41. Id. at 1204. 
 42. Id. at 1208. 
 43. Id. at 1212. 
 44. Id. at 1204. 
 45. AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986). 
 46. Republic of Arg. v. BG Grp. PLC, 665 F.3d 1363, 1369 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
4
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de novo.
47
  Ultimately, it is the prerogative of the contracting parties to determine 
which issues are for arbitrators and which are to be left for courts.
48
  When an 
agreement is silent on the matter of who primarily is to decide preliminary ques-




A.  The Issue of Arbitrability 
To avoid rendering arbitration a mere prelude to the cumbersome and time-
consuming judicial review process, the U.S. Supreme Court has long endorsed a 
liberal policy favoring arbitration with limited judicial review.
50
  But as a product 
of contract, arbitration requires party consent to establish jurisdiction.
51
  The Su-
preme Court has made clear the policy favoring arbitration does not presumptively 
apply to questions of “arbitrability” — whether the parties agreed to arbitrate a 
dispute.
52
  Thus, a court must distinguish between questions arising within the 
arbitration agreement — which are presumptively for arbitrators — and questions 
concerning the arbitrability of a dispute, which are presumptively for judges.
53
 
Whether or not the issue is about arbitrability is not always clear.
54
  In 
Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., the Supreme Court clarified that not every 
potentially dispositive gateway question concerns arbitrability.
55
  Questions of 
arbitrability have a limited scope containing only the kind of gateway questions 
that parties might expect a court to decide:  “procedural” questions arising from 
the dispute do not concern arbitrability and should be left to the arbitrator.
56
 
The Court first differentiated procedural questions in John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 
v. Livingston,
57
 a case in which a union and a publishing company could not agree 
on the status of a collective bargaining agreement concerning the rights of covered 
employees after a company merger.
58
  The company refused to recognize the bar-
gaining agreement and the union filed suit to compel arbitration under the collec-
tive bargaining agreement pursuant to federal law.
59
  The publishing company 
argued the collective bargaining agreement had not survived the merger, and even 
if it had, the union had not complied with the necessary procedural steps to reach 
arbitration.
60
  Thus, two questions emerged:  (1) whether the court or an arbitrator 
                                                          
 47. First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 947-48 (1995). 
 48. Id. at 943. 
 49. BG Grp., PLC, 134 S. Ct. at 1206. 
 50. Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 83 (2002) (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem’l 
Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983)). 
 51. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 592 (1960). 
 52. Howsam, 537 U.S. at 83. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 83-84. 
 55. Id. at 84. 
 56. Id. at 83-84, (citing John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 557 (1964)).  Addi-
tionally, issues concerning “allegation[s] of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability,” should be 
left to arbitrators.  Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983). 
 57. John Wiley & Sons, 376 U.S. 543 (1964). 
 58. Id. at 544-46. 
 59. Id. at 545-46.  The union sought to compel arbitration pursuant to § 301 of the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act. See id. at 544; 29 U.S.C. § 185 (2015). 
 60. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 376 U.S. at 546. 
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should decide whether the arbitration provisions survived the merger;
61
 and (2) 
whether a court or an arbitrator should determine if the procedural conditions to 
arbitration had been met.
62
 
In John Wiley, precedent dictated the duty to arbitrate was contractual; there-
fore, the determination of whether the duty does in fact exist is a question of 
arbitrability for judicial determination.
63
  Looking next at the procedural condi-
tions, the Court found although the conditions presented gateway questions to 
arbitration, the questions could not be answered without considering the merits of 
the dispute.
64
  To avoid unnecessary and illogical forum-splitting, once it is de-
termined parties are obligated to submit a dispute to arbitration, “‘procedural’ 
questions which grow out of the dispute and bear on its final disposition should be 
left to the arbitrator.”65  Regarding procedural disagreements as part of the dispute 
and not as separate disputes served the “best accords with the usual purposes” of 
arbitration and federal policy.
66
 
Because it is not always intuitive, the Court has attempted to provide guid-
ance on the distinction between questions that should be judicially determined and 
those that should be determined by arbitrators.  In First Options of Chicago v. 
Kaplan, the Court determined that it is courts that decide whether arbitration 
clauses should be enforced upon a party who had not personally signed the docu-
ment.
67
  Similarly, in AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers, the 
Court found courts are to decide whether a particular labor-management layoff 
dispute falls within the arbitration clause of a collective-bargaining contract.
68
  
Additionally, in Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co., the Court held that courts de-
cide whether clauses providing for arbitration of various “grievances” covers 
claims for damages for breach of a no-strike agreement.
69
 
Conversely, in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Const. Corp., 
the Court held “allegation[s] of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability” 
are presumptively for the arbitrator to decide,
70
 as are questions regarding satisfac-
tion of prerequisites such as time limits, notice, laches, estoppel, and other condi-
tions precedent to an obligation to arbitrate.
71
  Additionally, the Revised Uniform 
Arbitration Act of 2000 states “procedural” questions include conditions prece-
dent to arbitration such as time limits, notice, laches, and estoppel.
72
 
In sum, the case law surrounding who decides — courts or arbitrators — 
demonstrates a consistent aim to effectuate the use of arbitration in accordance 
with the consent of parties who enter the agreements.
73
  The rationale behind the 
designation of questions of arbitrability to judges and procedural questions to 
arbitrators maintains the presumption that parties intend to align decision makers 
                                                          
 61. Id. at 544. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 547. 
 64. Id. at 557. 
 65. Id. 
 66. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 376 U.S. at 559. 
 67. First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943-47 (1995). 
 68. AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 651 (1986). 
 69. Atkinson v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 370 U.S. 238, 241-43 (1962). 
 70. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983). 
 71. Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 85 (2002) (quoting REVISED UNIF. 
ARBITRATION ACT § 6(c) cmt. 2, 7 U.L.A. 12-13 (Supp. 2002)). 
 72. REVISED UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 6(c) cmt. 2, 7 U.L.A. 12-13 (Supp. 2002). 
 73. Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960). 
6
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with their fields of relevant expertise, so as to best secure fair and expeditious 
resolutions of arbitration disagreements.
74
 
B.  Bilateral Investment Treaties 
BITs are negotiated agreements between two nations that protect investments 
by citizens of one nation who are in the territory of the other by creating rules 
governing the host nation’s treatment of the investment and establishing dispute 
resolution mechanisms for alleged violations of those rules.
75
  Unlike commercial 
treaties,
76
 the primary purpose of BITs is not to facilitate trade, but rather to attract 
foreign investment by ensuring fair and equitable treatment.
77
  BITs have emerged 
as an important tool for the protection and promotion of the increasingly important 
international economic activity of foreign investment and have increased substan-
tially in number since the 1950s.
78
 
Though BITs carry the same force of any international treaty, they typically 
allow greater flexibility for termination, revision, or replacement.  Most BITs can 
be terminated unilaterally or by mutual consent.  The Vienna Convention allows 
parties to terminate their agreement by mutual consent at any time;
79
 however, the 
rules for unilateral treaty termination are typically described in the BIT itself.
80
  
Most BITs have an initial term of 10 or 15 years, after which about 80% of all 
BITs then allow the agreement to be terminated any point.
81
  Additionally, BITs 
can be revised through amendments that modify or remove existing provisions in 
a treaty or add new ones.
82
 
C.  Review of Arbitral Decisions 
The review of arbitration awards under BITs typically must be sought pursu-
ant to the law of the nation in which the arbitration takes place.
83
  The New York 
Convention is an international convention created in 1958 that governs interna-
tional arbitration.
84
  For parties to the convention, it is an important tool in the 
                                                          
 74. Id. 
 75. Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The Economics of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 41 HARV. INT’L L.J. 
469, 469-70 (2000). 
 76. Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation treaties, have been around since the founding of the 
American Republic, and typically, these agreements provide for most-favored-nation treatment with 
respect to trade, mutual guarantees against discrimination, exchange of consuls, and duties of parties 
with respect to neutral trade in time of war.   Vandevelde, supra note 75, at 203-04. 
 77. Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 1, at 83. 
 78. Id. at 67 (citing U.N. Conference on Trade & Dev., World Investment Report 2003 FDI Policies 
For Development: National And International Perspectives, 89, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WIR/2003 
(Sept. 4, 2003) (from 1959 to 2002 nearly 2200 BITs were created)). 
 79. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 54(b), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [herein-
after Vienna Convention]. 
 80. World Investment Report 2013, supra note 4, at 108.  If not, the rules of the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties apply.  Id. at 118 n.55. 
 81. World Investment Report 2013, supra note 4, at 109. 
 82. Id. at 108. 
 83. KENNETH J. VANDEVELDE, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES: HISTORY, POLICY, AND 
INTERPRETATION 446 (2010). 
 84. See Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 
21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter New York Convention] (arbitrations initiated under ICSID 
7
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recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitration awards.  The New York Con-
vention applies to the “recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards made in the 
territory of a State other than the State where the recognition and enforcement of 
such awards are sought.”85 
In the United States, the Federal Arbitration Act
86
 is an act of Congress that 
governs the resolution of disputes through foreign and domestic arbitration and 
incorporates the New York Convention.
87
  The FAA and the New York Conven-
tion provide a party to arbitration may move to affirm or vacate an award in the 
federal court of the place of arbitration.
88
  When reviewing an award made in the 
United States under the FAA, the federal court generally applies U.S. law.
89
 
Under the FAA, there are limited grounds upon which a court may vacate or 
overturn the decisions of an arbitration panel seated in the United States.
90
  Sec-
tion 9 of the FAA states a court must grant confirmation of an award unless “va-
cated, modified, or corrected” pursuant to sections 10 or 11.91  Section 10 provides 
grounds upon which a court may vacate an award, such as fraud or an arbitration 
panel that has exceeded its power.
92
  Section 11 provides grounds for correction, 
such as a material mistake.
93
  The Supreme Court has reiterated these grounds are 
intended to be narrow.
94
 
The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) is 
an important body in commercial arbitration.
95
  UNCITRAL developed The Mod-
el Law on International Commercial Arbitration (Model Law) in 1985 in an effort 
to make the treatment of commercial arbitration consistent from one country to the 
next.
96
  Article 8 of the Model Law provides for the enforcement of valid arbitra-
tion agreements through national courts, regardless of the location of the arbitra-
tion.
97
  Article 16 grants arbitrators authority to consider their own jurisdiction, 
and Article 5 prescribes judicial non-intervention in proceedings.
98
  The Model 
Law also affirms party autonomy with regard to arbitral procedures, absent an 
agreement between the parties.
99
 
An important governing regime or arbitration specific to investment treaties is 
the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).
100
  The 
                                                          
are generally not subject to the New York Convention or national arbitration legislation); see also 
GARY BORN, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: LAW AND PRACTICE 40 (2012). 
 85. New York Convention, supra note 84, at art. I(1) (1958). 
 86. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307 (2014). 
 87. Id. at §§ 201-208. 
 88. Id. at §§ 9, 10. 
 89. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 7, 1959, Art. 
V(1)(e), 1970 WL 104417. 
 90. 9 U.S.C. §§ 9-11. 
 91. Id. at § 9. 
 92. Id. § 10. 
 93. Id. § 11. 
 94. Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 588 (2008). 
 95. GARY BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 115 (2009) [hereinafter BORN, INT’L 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION]. 
 96. GARY BORN, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: LAW & PRACTICE 23 (2012) [hereinafter BORN, 
LAW & PRACTICE]. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 40. 
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ICSID Convention is a specialized international treaty
101
 that facilitates settlement 
investment disputes between consenting parties.
102
  If parties agree to submit a 
dispute to ICSID arbitration, the ICSID Convention provides a stand-alone legal 
framework generally not subject to the New York Convention or other arbitration 
governing legislation.
103
  If parties agree to submit a dispute to ICSID arbitration, 
it will be administered wholly by ICSID and almost entirely detached from na-
tional law and national courts.
104
 
D.  Interpreting Treaties 
Like arbitration under traditional contracts, arbitration between a State and a 
foreign investor under an investment treaty is based on consent.
105
  Arbitration 
under a treaty is unique because consent does not come directly from the parties in 
arbitration (state and foreign investors), but instead comes from the multiple states 
that were signatories to the original treaty.
106
  Consequently, review of arbitration 
awards under investment treaties includes interpretation of treaties. 
In Air France v. Saks, the U.S. Supreme Court determined treaties should be 
interpreted more liberally than private agreements given their nature and pur-
pose.
107
  This purpose includes determining a treaty’s meaning by looking beyond 
the written words:  to the history of the treaty, the negotiations involved, and the 
practical interpretation adopted by the parties.
108
  Despite this liberal interpretive 
approach, a reviewing court should also begin its analysis by reviewing the plain 
text and context of the treaty.
109
  A court must ultimately give the words of the 
treaty “a meaning consistent with the shared expectations of the contracting par-
ties.”110  The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides similar guid-
ance, directing courts to begin with the plain language of a treaty when interpret-
ing its meaning.
111
  Although courts may find such guidance helpful, the extent to 
                                                          
 101. There were 151 contracting parties as of April 18, 2015.  Id. at 412 (citing List of Contracting 
States and Other Signatories of the Convention, ICSID (April 18, 2015), https://icsid.worldbank.org/ 
apps/ICSIDWEB/icsiddocs/Documents/List%20of%20Contracting%20States%20and%20Other%20Si
gnatories%20of%20the%20Convention%20-%20Latest.pdf). 
 102. BORN, LAW & PRACTICE, supra note 96, at 412. 
 103. Id. at 40. 
 104. Id. at 412 (citing International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes Convention, Oct. 
14, 1966, Arts. 41, 52, 53, available at https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc/ 
CRR_English-final.pdf; C. SCHREUER ET AL., THE ICSID CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY 516–24 (2d 
ed. 2009)). 
 105. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Vacatur and Remand, BG Grp., PLC 
v. Republic of Arg., 134 S. Ct. 1198 (2014) (No. 12-138), 2013 WL 4737184, *15 (citing 
CHRISTOPHER F. DUGAN ET AL., INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION 219 (2008); Christoph Schreuer, 
Consent to Arbitration, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 830, 831 
(Peter Muchlinski et al. eds., 2008); VANDEVELDE, supra note 83, at 433; JESWALD W. SALACUSE, 
THE LAW OF INVESTMENT TREATIES 385 (2010)). 
 106. Id. 
 107. Air Fr. v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 396 (1985) (quoting Choctaw Nation of Indians v. United States, 
318 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1943)). 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 397. 
 110. Id. at 399 (citing Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir. 1977)). 
 111. Jogi v. Voges, 480 F.3d 822, 833 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing Vienna Convention, supra note 79, at 
art. 26) (the United States is a signatory to the treaty but has not ratified the treaty; nevertheless, the 
treaty’s instruction is useful in determining international norms). 
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which treaties should be evaluated differently from traditional contracts is not 
always clear. 
IV.  INSTANT DECISION 
In the instant case, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia Circuit, and found that arbitrators’ jurisdictional determi-
nations are lawful.
112
  In doing so, it established the guidelines for interpreting 
provisions in ordinary contracts should also be used to interpret and apply a trea-
ty’s gateway provisions concerning arbitration.113  Under this framework, the local 




A.  Procedural Precondition to Arbitration — The Majority Opinion 
The Court began its analysis by reviewing the Treaty as if it were an ordinary 
contract.
115
  Citing Howsam, it determined the requirement of local litigation was 
a procedural question of arbitrability, as the provision determined when the duty 
to arbitrate began, not whether such a duty existed.
116
  Furthermore, no explicit 
language deposed the presumption that the provision, as a procedural precondi-
tion, should be interpreted and applied by arbitrators.
117
 
Under ordinary contract law, jurisdiction belonged to the arbitrators; howev-
er, the appropriateness of making such an application to a treaty remained in ques-
tion.
118
  A treaty, according to the Court, is essentially a contract between nations, 
and like an ordinary contract, the foundation of its interpretation should be the 
intent of the parties.
119
  Under the FAA, a court should apply the framework sup-
plied by U.S. law; because the local litigation requirement was not clearly stated 
as a condition of consent to arbitration, the traditional contract framework was 
appropriate.
120
  The Court reserved the D.C. Circuit’s holding that the traditional 
contract framework would be appropriate when interpreting a provision clearly 
stated as a condition of consent.
121
  As a result, the fact the document was a treaty 
did not make a critical difference to the high Court’s analysis.122 
The Court next searched for other evidence in the Treaty that would alter the 
presumption the parties intended threshold arbitration issues to be left to the arbi-
                                                          
 112. BG Grp., PLC v. Republic of Arg., 134 S. Ct. 1198, 1213 (2014). 
 113. Id. at 1210. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 1206. 
 116. Id. at 1207. 
 117. Id. 
 118. BG Grp., PLC 134 S. Ct. at 1208. 
 119. Id. (citing Air Fr. v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392 (1985)). 
 120. Id. at 1208-09; see also New York Convention, supra note 84, at art. V(1)(e) (an award can be 
“set aside or suspended by a competent authority of the country in which, or under the law of which, 
that award was made”); VANDEVELDE, supra note 83, at 446 (arbitration awards under treaties are 
“subject to review under the arbitration law of the state where the arbitration takes place”); 
CHRISTOPHER DUGAN ET AL., INVESTOR–STATE ARBITRATION 636 (2008) (“[T]he national courts and 
the law of the legal status of arbitration control a losing party’s attempt to set aside [an] award.”). 
 121. BG Grp., PLC, 134 S. Ct. at 1209. 
 122. Id. at 1208. 
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trators.
123
  No evidence indicated either of the parties had an intent contrary to the 
ordinary presumptions, and the text and structure of the litigation requirement 
made clear it was a procedural condition precedent to arbitration.
124
  The Treaty 
did, however, authorize the use of international arbitration associations
125
 whose 
rules granted arbitrators the authority to determine provisions like the local litiga-
tion provision.
126
  Furthermore, the majority of international authorities agreed the 
local litigation provision was a procedural precondition to arbitration.
127
  Finding 
the ordinary presumption was not overcome, the Court held interpretation and 
application of the provision should primarily be left to the arbitrator and lower 




Having determined the arbitrator’s decision should be given deference; the 
Court lastly reviewed the decision of the arbitrators to excuse BG Group’s non-
compliance with the local litigation requirement.
129
  Argentina argued the arbitra-
tion panel exceeded its authority even if the standard was one of high deference.
130
  
The Court rejected Argentina’s argument and found the arbitrators’ conclusion the 
litigation provision was not an absolute impediment to arbitration was within the 
arbitral forum’s interpretative discretion.131  Ultimately, this holding affirmed the 
arbitrators’ initial conclusion that Argentina’s actions precluded BG Group’s obli-
gation to adhere to the local litigation provision was not barred by the Treaty.
132
 
B.  Parties May Condition Consent — The Concurring Opinion 
Justice Sotomayor agreed with the majority that the provision was a proce-
dural precondition to arbitration, but wrote separately to address the majority’s 
dicta regarding the interpretation of treaties containing explicit conditions of con-
                                                          
 123. Id. at 1210. 
 124. Id.  “[The Treaty] says that a dispute ‘shall be submitted to international arbitration’ if ‘one of 
the Parties so requests,’ as long as ‘a period of eighteen months has elapsed’ since the dispute was 
‘submitted’ to a local tribunal and the tribunal ‘has not given its final decision.’ . . .  It determines when 
the contractual duty to arbitrate arises, not whether there is a contractual duty to arbitrate at all.”  Id. at 
1207 (quoting Arg.-U.K. Agreement for Investments, supra note 10, at art. 8(2)). 
 125. Arg.-U.K. Agreement for Investments, supra note 10, at art. 8(3) (providing the agreement 
would be enforced pursuant to the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID) as well as the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL)). 
 126. BG Grp., PLC v. Republic of Arg., 134 S. Ct. 1198, 1210 (2014); accord, U.N. Commission on 
Int’l Trade law, UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, art. 23(1), G.A. Res. 65/22, U.N. Doc. A/RES/65/22 
(Jan. 10, 2011) (“[the] arbitral tribunal shall have the power to rule on its own jurisdiction”); Conven-
tion on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States art. 41(1), 
Mar. 18, 1965, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 (providing that the “[t]ribunal shall be the judge of its own compe-
tence”). 
 127. BG Grp., PLC, 134 S. Ct. at 1211 (“A substantial body of arbitral authority from investor-state 
disputes concludes that compliance with procedural mechanisms in an arbitration agreement (or bilat-
eral investment treaty) is not ordinarily a jurisdictional prerequisite” (quoting BORN, INT’L 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, supra note 95, at 842)). 
 128. Id. at 1210. 
 129. Id. at 1212; see also 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) (2014) (providing that an award may be vacated “where 
arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite 
award upon the subject matter submitted was not made”). 
 130. BG Grp., PLC, 134 S. Ct. at 1212. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 1213. 
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sent.
133
  Sotomayor argued that if a clear condition of consent
134
 was placed on a 
seemingly procedural treaty provision it would likely raise questions of 
arbitrability that would need to be decided by a court.
135
  In her view, consent is 
“especially salient in the context of bilateral investment treaties” because they 
involve agreements between a nation and an unknown class of investors, rather 
than two known parties.
136
  Explicit language may demonstrate a nation reasona-
bly wished to create conditions that had to be satisfied before submitting its sover-
eign decisions to a foreign arbitration panel.
137
  If the provision at issue were 
clearly labeled a condition to the consent of the parties, it would change the analy-
sis to a determination of whether the parties intended the requirement to be inter-
preted by a court or an arbitrator.
138
 
C.  Condition of Consent to Arbitration — The Dissenting Opinion 
Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Kennedy, disagreed that the litigation 
provision was merely a procedural precondition to arbitration.
139
  In dissent, they 
argued the investment treaty could not constitute an agreement to arbitrate be-
cause no investor was a party to the Treaty.
140
  Instead, the treaty was merely an 
offer by the signatory nations to arbitrate, and no agreement was created until the 




The dissent began its analysis by considering the plain language and purpose 
of the treaty.
142
  Of particular importance was the fact the “arbitration clause” in 
the treaty was not a stand-alone provision, but was rather a subordinate part of a 
broader dispute resolution provision.
143
  The arbitration provision provided three 
routes to arbitration:  two through local litigation, and one through mutual agree-
ment.
144
  The alternative routes to arbitration demonstrated Argentina did not in-
tend the provision to be an existing agreement, but rather an agreement to be 
formed once a foreign investor satisfied the conditions.
145
  Another arbitration 
tribunal
146
 had also reached this conclusion about the local litigation require-
                                                          
 133. Id. (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 134. Id. at 1214.  “Consider, for example, the United States–Korea Free Trade Agreement . . . in-
cludes a provision explicitly entitled ‘Conditions and Limitations on Consent of Each Party.’  That 
provision declares that ‘[n]o claim may be submitted to arbitration’ unless a claimant first waives its 
‘right to initiate or continue before any administrative tribunal or court . . . any proceeding with respect 
to any measure alleged to constitute a breach’ under another provision of the treaty.”  Id. (quoting Free 
Trade Agreement Between The United States of America and the Republic of Korea, U.S.-S. Kor., art. 
11.18, June 30, 2007, available at https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/fta/korus/ 
asset_upload_file587_12710.pdf)). 
 135. Id. at 1213 (citing Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 84 (2002)). 
 136. BG Grp., PLC, 132 S. Ct. at 1213. 
 137. Id. at 1214. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 1215 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 140. Id. at 1216. 
 141. Id. 
 142. BG Grp., PLC, 134 S. Ct. at 1215. 
 143. Id. at 1216-17. 
 144. Id. at 1217. 
 145. Id. 
 146. See ICS Inspection & Control Servs. Ltd. v. Argentine Republic, Case No. 2010–9, Award on 
Jurisdiction, ¶ 262 (Permanent Court of Arbitration 2012), http://www.italaw.com/documents/ 
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ment.
147
  The dissent rebuffed the majority’s finding of a lack of explicit language 
dispositive in determining the litigation requirement could not be a condition to 
consent.  Other terms in the Treaty also clearly constituted conditions
148
 even 
though not explicitly labeled.
149
 
Argentina’s status as a sovereign state was further persuasion the local litiga-
tion requirement was a condition on consent and not a simple procedural precon-
dition.
150
  It was no light matter for a state to waive sovereign immunity and allow 
sovereign decisions to be reviewed by foreign adjudicators.
151
  This is especially 
true when the reviewing body is neither domestic nor judicial.
152
  The dissent 
concluded that, within this context, the United Kingdom and Argentina intended 
to require special limitations on the use of arbitration by foreign investors.
153
  
Local litigation requirement is an important limitation because it gives the host 
country the opportunity to render a decision on the dispute first, to narrow the 




Since the Treaty’s local litigation requirement was a condition of consent to 
arbitrate, review was to be de novo.
155
  The Court found that logically an arbitrator 
could not decide if the parties have consented if the arbitrators’ authority itself 
depends on the decision.
156
  Under Howsam, since the consent of the parties was 
in controversy, it is for the courts to decide whether consent existed, or else arbi-
trators risk forcing parties to arbitrate a dispute.
157
 
Ultimately, the dissent found the Court of Appeals was correct to determine 
the case should be reviewed de novo; but also disagreed with the D.C. Circuit’s 
conclusion that BG Group did not submit its dispute to the local courts first, and 
thereby invalidated the award by the arbitration panel.
158
  A “leading treatise” 
states an offeree’s failure to comply with a condition will not negate an action if 
failure to comply is the offeror’s fault.159  The dissent determined the case should 
be remanded to the Court of Appeals to determine de novo whether this principle 
was incorporated into the Treaty.
160
  As a result, the opinions of both the majority 
                                                          
ICS_v_Argentina_AwardJurisdiction_10Feb2012_En.pdf. (“Not only has the Respondent specifically 
conditioned its consent to arbitration on a requirement not yet fulfilled, but the Contracting Parties to 
the Treaty have expressly required the prior submission of a dispute to the Argentine courts for at least 
18 months, before a recourse to international arbitration is initiated.  The Tribunal is simply not em-
powered to disregard these limits on its jurisdiction.”). 
 147. BG Grp., PLC, 134 S. Ct. at 1218. 
 148. Must be a foreign investor, must have a treaty claim, and must be suing another party to the 
treaty.  Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. at 1219. 
 151. Id. 
 152. JESWALD SALACUSE, THE LAW OF INVESTMENT TREATIES 137 (2010) (“Granting a private party 
the right to bring an action against a sovereign state in an international tribunal regarding an invest-
ment dispute is a revolutionary innovation” whose “uniqueness and power should not be over-
looked.”). 
 153. BG Grp., PLC, 134 S. Ct. at 1219. 
 154. Id. at 1221. 
 155. Id. (citing Adams v. Suozzi, 433 F.3d 220, 226–28 (2d Cir. 2005)). 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. (citing Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 83-84 (2002)). 
 158. Id. at 1223. 
 159. BG Grp., PLC, 134 S. Ct. at 1224 (citing RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 5:14 
(4th ed. 2013)). 
 160. Id. 
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and dissent may have resulted in the same outcome for the parties; nevertheless, 
the impact of each decision on the law could hardly be more divergent. 
V.  COMMENT 
The dispute between BG Group and Argentina presents a unique and con-
founding question of first impression before the U.S. Supreme Court.  The contro-
versy contained many elements similar to commercial arbitration disputes, but 
also presented unique considerations like treaty interpretation and sovereignty.  
Unsurprisingly, the striking characteristics of the instant decision are the Court’s 
unambiguous attempt to bring clarity to the very muddled topic and its desire to 
strongly affirm policies favoring arbitration autonomy.  Although the decision in 
BG Group, PLC should only apply domestically, it may ultimately have an effect 
on arbitration globally, given the popularity of the United States as the seat of 




A.  Framing the Analysis 
The Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit relied on 
much the same case law, yet announced different holdings.  A significant factor in 
the courts’ incongruous outcomes was the starting analyses point.  The Supreme 
Court began by reviewing the dispute as if it were a contract between private par-
ties.
162
  It distinguished substantive and procedural questions of arbitrability and 
respective presumptions as it previously had in Howsam.
163
  Applying these pre-
sumptions, the Court analyzed the parties’ intent using the proper presumption.164  
On the other hand, the Appellate Court left the lower court’s discretion undis-
turbed unless clear evidence of intent to the contrary existed.
165
  The Appellate 
Court devoted the majority of its analysis to the determination whether the parties 
intended the question of arbitrability to be answered by an arbitrator.
166
  The Ap-
pellate Court focused on how John Wiley and Howsam differed from the present 
dispute. 
B.  Aligning International and Domestic Arbitration Decisions 
BG Group, PLC signals the Court’s aligning of BIT interpretative framework 
with commercial arbitration provisions.  The Supreme Court rejected the narrow 
application and muddled distinction of John Wiley and Howsam, choosing instead 
to recognize the similarities between commercial and investment arbitration prior 
to analyzing differences.
167
  Because it declined to adopt the dissent’s view that a 
new framework should be developed to allow for greater judicial review of awards 
granted under BITs, the Court in BG Group, PLC makes an important statement 
                                                          
 161. See BORN, INT’L COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, supra note 95, at 2063. 
 162. BG Grp., PLC, 134 S. Ct. at 1206. 
 163. Id. at 1207. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Republic of Arg. v. BG Grp., PLC, 665 F.3d 1363, 1369-70 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
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regarding the importance of autonomy in international arbitration tribunals.  This 
conclusion affirmed the longstanding recognition and enforcement of a liberal 
policy favoring arbitration and endorses a broad application of Howsam in deter-
mining the scope of judicial review of arbitration decisions.
168
 
C.  Possible Negative Impacts on Sovereigns 
As the dissent notes, there are legitimate reasons a State might desire an in-
vestor to first file a dispute in a local court, while still giving investors the abso-
lute assurance that they have recourse in arbitration.
169
  States have increasingly 
sought to resolve BIT disputes domestically.
170
  A recent study on Investor-State 
Dispute settlements (ISDS) found “70% of recent treaties explicitly mention do-
mestic judicial review as a dispute settlement mechanism in their ISDS clauses.  
Many also seek to coordinate the use of domestic judicial review with investor 
recourse in international arbitration.”171  The trend favoring international arbitra-
tion as recourse to domestic judicial procedures may demonstrate that local review 
provisions are important parts of states’ consent to arbitrate.172  Although the 
Court’s deferential approach may prove beneficial for investors and courts 
through increased clarity and judicial efficiency, it carried the potential to also 




The 2013 World Investment Report, published by the United Nations Confer-
ence on Trade and Development, identifies several “systemic deficiencies” exist-
ing in the dispute settlement regime between investors and the states that may be 
impacted by the Court’s holding in BG Group, PLC.174  First, it is questionable 
whether arbitration panels can be entrusted with evaluating the validity of a 
States’ acts, especially when such questions involve issues of policy.175  Sover-
eignty allows a nation to maintain its own economic affairs, handle financial cri-
ses, and control its own development.
176
  In the wake of the recent world financial 
crisis, economic self-determination has become an especially cogent part of the 
argument in favor of national sovereignty.
177
  Both the dissent and concurrence 
bring to light the weightiness of a sovereign’s decision to grant private adjudica-
                                                          
 168. Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 83 (2002). 
 169. Id. 
 170. David Gaukrodger & Kathryn Gordon, Investor-State Dispute Settlement: A Scoping Paper for 
the Investment Policy Community 65 (Org. for Econ. Co-Operation & Dev., Working Papers on Int’l 
Inv. No. 2012/03, 2012), available at http://www.oecd.org/investment/investment-policy/WP-2012 
_3.pdf. 
 171. Id.  See, e.g., Arg.-U.K. Agreement for Investments, supra note 10, at art. 8(2) (providing claim-
ants the ability to file in domestic court before moving to arbitration). 
 172. Id.; see also BG Grp., PLC v. Republic of Arg., 134 S. Ct. 1198, 1214 (2014). 
 173. World Investment Report 2013, supra note 4, at 112. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Duncan E. Williams, Policy Perspectives on the Use of Capital Controls in Emerging Market 
Nations: Lessons from the Asian Financial Crisis and a Look at the International Legal Regime, 70 
FORDHAM L. REV. 561, 601 (2001). 
 177. Robert M. Ziff, The Sovereign Debtor’s Prison: Analysis of the Argentine Crisis Arbitrations 
and the Implications for Investment Treaty Law, 10 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 345, 348 (2011). 
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tors “a power it typically reserves to its own courts, if it grants it at all: the power 
to sit in judgment on its sovereign acts.”178 
The claims against Argentina raise important questions about the balance that 
needs to be struck between (1) BITs’ guarantee of a stable climate for foreign 
investors and, (2) a sovereign’s ability to respond to economic crises with inde-
pendence and in good faith.
179
  As the dissent noted, the weighty public responsi-
bilities of a sovereign will affect the expectations regarding obligations under a 
BIT; likewise, the tumultuous nature of world economic conditions should cause 
investors’ expectations to incorporate the possibility that extraordinary circum-
stances may necessitate state regulatory action.
180
  In the instant decision, the 
Court elected not to distinguish this unique attribute of sovereign parties and in-
stead extended the same presumptions utilized in commercial arbitration dis-
putes.
181
  This will likely put some sovereign nations in an uneasy position, as 
they must more carefully weigh the economic incentives of BITs against possible 
restrictions on economic planning and policy implementation. 
Second, sovereign nations’ ability to weigh the important consequences of 
BITs is undercut by inconsistent findings by arbitral tribunals.
182
  Divergent legal 
interpretations of identical or similar treaty provisions as well as differences in the 
assessment of the merits of cases create uncertainty that may well be compounded 
by the instant decision.
183
  Indeed, arbitral tribunals have already rendered incon-
sistent decisions regarding the effect of the local litigation requirement and similar 
provisions as the dissent pointed out.
184
  No decision by the Supreme Court would 
provide complete consistency given the many operative legal frameworks around 
the globe; however, a decision providing for greater judicial oversight would at 
least produce greater consistency to parties choosing to arbitrate in the United 
States. 
Though inconsistency is to some degree the nature of arbitration, the concern 
is especially heightened when the inconsistency concerns the consent of the par-
ties to arbitrate.  By determining local litigation provisions are presumptively for 
arbitrators, States may now be subjected to differing interpretations of consent to 
arbitrate.  As a result, local litigation requirements will be thrown into uncertainty 
as they are at times deemed necessary for consent, and other times determined 
waivable.  Such a result is not simply undesirable, but also in conflict with tradi-




                                                          
 178. BG Grp., PLC v. Republic of Arg., 134 S. Ct. 1198, 1220 (2014) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 179. Ziff, supra note 177, at 354-55. 
 180. Id. at 361. 
 181. BG Grp., PLC, 134 S. Ct. at 1208. 
 182. World Investment Report 2013, supra note 4, at 112. 
 183. Id. 
 184. BG Grp., PLC 134 S. Ct. at 1218; see also ICS Inspection & Control Servs. Ltd. v. Argentine 
Republic, PCA Case No. 2010–9, Award on Jurisdiction, ¶ 262 (Permanent Court of Arbitration 2012), 
http://www.italaw.com/documents/ICS_v_Argentina_AwardJurisdiction_10Feb2012_En.pdf (the 
panel concluded it had no jurisdiction until the local litigation provision was fulfilled); Daimler Fin. 
Servs. AG v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/1, Award, ¶¶ 193, 194 (ICSID Trib. 2012), 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita1082.pdf; Wintershall Aktiengesellschaft 
v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/14, Award, ¶ 116 (ICSID Trib. 2008), http://www. 
italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0907.pdf. 
 185. See Air Fr. v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 396 (1985); Vienna Convention, supra note 79. 
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Third, an increasing number of challenges to arbitrators may indicate that 
disputing parties perceive them as biased or predisposed.
186
  Particular concerns 
have arisen from perceived tendencies of each disputing party to appoint individu-
als sympathetic to their own case; concerns amplified by arbitrators’ interest in 
being re-appointed in future cases and a tendency to serve as arbitrators in some 
cases and counsel in others.
187
  It appears over 50% of ISDS arbitrators have acted 
as counsel for investors in other ISDS cases, while it has been estimated about 
10% of ISDS arbitrators acted as counsel for States in other cases.
188
  Such statis-
tics may also imply a predisposition favoring investors:  at the end of 2012, 31% 
of ISDS cases ended in favor of the investor and 27% were settled.
189
  Additional-
ly, ICSID tribunals upheld investor claims in approximately 46% of cases, with 
only 28% of cases seeing investor claims dismissed.
190
 
Such concerns hold a potential impact for the perceived legitimacy of interna-
tional arbitration:  over the past decade, three States — Bolivia, Ecuador, and 
Venezuela — have withdrawn from ICSID, claiming investment arbitration erodes 
sovereignty while favoring investors.
191
  These governments are not alone in their 
criticisms of the current international arbitration framework.
192
  Even proponents 
of investment arbitration like the United States and Canada have revisited their 
model BITs to limit the scope of investor protections.
193
 
D.  Possible Future Effects 
Despite the discontent of some sovereigns,
194
 the instant decision is likely to 
maintain the United States’ position as a leader in hosting international arbitration 
tribunals.
195
  In a system where autonomy is fundamental, leaving responsibility in 
the hands of the parties and arbitral governance regimes is perhaps imperative to 
its survival.  As UNCITRAL and other groups develop solutions to the “systemic 
deficiencies” in ISDS, BG Group, PLC may well be seen internationally as an 
important instance of judicial restraint. 
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The instant decision will likely serve to impose a clear rule that will require 
parties to state their intent “clearly and unmistakably.”196  Unfortunately, the 
court’s failure to conclusively clarify what language demonstrates a clear intent to 
reserve consent will certainly add some uncertainty to the drafting process.  Addi-
tionally, the instant decision may have some consequences for investors as States 
have no choice but to restrict paths to international arbitration if they want to 
maintain a consistently enforceable local litigation provision.
197
  Although BG 
Group, PLC refused to find enough distinction in the fact the creation of a BIT is 
not manifested between contesting parties to warrant abandonment of the tradi-
tional contract framework, it does not change the fact investors are not present 
when BITs are formed.  As a result, investors may see further-restricted paths to 
arbitration, but no voice in the BIT drafting process to oppose these restrictions.
198
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The result in BG Group, PLC demonstrates the Court’s desire to sustain arbi-
tration as an effective and independent means of resolving disputes.  The Court 
displayed an inclination to limit the influence of the judiciary on the process of 
BIT arbitration, recognizing the important position of BITs in global commerce 
and the prominence of the United States.
199
  Ultimately, the Court aligned the 
interpretive framework of domestic and international arbitration review in an ef-
fort to simplify review for courts and better inform stakeholders to the level of 
involvement of the judicial system in BITs that contain arbitration provisions.
200
 
Though the effect of this decision is still somewhat unclear, it will likely be 
met with divergent reactions.  Some States may see the decision as an affront to 
national sovereignty and as an aggravation to some systemic deficiencies in the 
ISDS regime.
201
  As a result, these States may regard the system as less legitimate 
and attempt to restrict investor’s accessibility to arbitration through BIT revi-
sion.
202
  Such a result would be injurious to investors who have no voice in the 
process and could ultimately decrease mutually beneficial investment.  Converse-
ly, many parties might also see the Court’s deferential approach as beneficial to 
the arbitration process via increased clarity and judicial efficiency.
203
  In this way, 
the decision may be seen as an important instance of judicial restraint — uphold-
ing the foundational aspect of autonomy in arbitration — and leaving ISDS devel-
opment in the hands of parties and arbitral governance regimes. 
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